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bstract: In this comparative analysis of the UK and Swe­
den, we consider, if inherited wealth is most deserving of 
redistributive taxation, then what lessons, if any, may be 
learned from the difficult paths faced by this tax in these countries. 
We conclude that the political momentum behind the Swedish family 
business was distinct, and, possibly, capable of travel to the UK. 
Keywords: Tax; Inheritance; Intergenerational justice
Introduction
The morality of inheritance is difficult, and there are long-stand-
ing disagreements as to whether inheritance should be taxed. 
Piketty,1 Beckert,2 Halliday, White and others have considered 
the nuances of this question, whilst international organisations 
have taken a step further and emphasised connections between 
inherited wealth and persistent intergenerational inequality.3 Is it 
possible to devise a tax on inherited wealth that would be ac-
cepted on a “global” scale? Inheritance taxation has developed 
in quite distinct ways in different jurisdictions, with significant 
legal differences (Beckert 2008).4 The rate and extent to which 
inheritance taxation plays a meaningful role in the redistribution 
of wealth in different jurisdictions, naturally, varies. The evolu-
tion of, and indeed tolerance for, inheritance taxation in different 
countries is deeply culturally specific. 
The fact of difference is a starting point for this article. The project 
comparatively will consider inheritance taxation in two jurisdic-
tions, with the aim of identifying insights as to ways in which 
countries organise tax systems to respond to inherited wealth. 
This analytical approach acknowledges a debt to the tradition of 
Beckert, who constructed a similar, yet much more ambitious, 
expansive, and historical analysis of France, Germany and the 
United States (2008). Overall, this article provides a brief review 
of important, historical moments in the United Kingdom, and 
Sweden. This permits us to consider whether, if we accept the 
premise that, out of all other forms of wealth, inherited wealth 
is most deserving of redistributive taxation, the time has come to 
consider what lessons, if any, may be learned from the difficult 
paths faced by this tax in different countries around the world.
This article is in three parts. Following a review of the scholarly 
debate, inheritance taxation in the UK is introduced, largely with 
an eye cast towards historically significant moments of contro-
versy.5 Next, a review of Swedish inheritance taxation is con-
ducted. Finally, points of convergence between the two systems 
are considered, largely for insights into the normative underpin-
nings of inheritance taxation.6 
This paper aims to continue Piketty’s project of identifying “be-
lief systems” (2017). The methodology involves legal narrative, 
or storytelling. Key moments in the political and legal histories 
of the taxation of inherited wealth in the UK, and Sweden, are 
identified, considered and compared. The criterion for choosing 
these moments is the question: did this moment lead, in our view, 
to the tax surviving (UK) or not (Sweden)? If yes, then we explain 
our reasons for believing this, and consider the point of difference 
between the two countries.
Why a comparative review, and why the UK and Sweden?
Comparative analysis of histories in both the UK and Sweden 
reveals that different, figurative taxpayers have emerged as key fo-
cal points for debate during moments of change; and, we argue, 
this demonstrates that it is important not only to talk about the 
value of the tax, but also who will be seen to be paying the tax. 
Put simply, the identity of the figurative taxpayer is an important 
part of the story of inheritance taxes, in both the UK and Sweden.
 
The particular significance of the approach adopted in this paper 
is that it considers one jurisdiction which currently has a tax on 
inherited wealth (the United Kingdom) and one which does not 
(Sweden). Despite this stark point of difference, there are many 
points of historical similarity between these countries. Thus, mo-
ments of convergence within these joint histories are identified 
within this article. The question we seek to answer is: given that 
Sweden and the UK are similar in a number of important ways, 
and yet different in others, what then is it possible to learn about 
the manner in which countries may organise taxes to respond to 
persistent inequalities in wealth?
This question is important, and a comparative approach is rele-
vant, because of the significant role that Piketty has played in the 
emergence of an active, global discourse. His famous book Capital 
contains a great deal of engagement with both the history and 
economic thought behind inheritance taxation in the UK (2017). 
Simply, he considers this deeply specific British history to be glob-
ally relevant; and, as the OECD’s proposal7 indicates, his analyses 
are having a pragmatic impact. 
The methodological approach adopted in this paper aims to 
challenge assumptions about the legal histories of the UK and 
Sweden. Legal narrative is well known for enabling (often, auto-
biographical) analyses of injustice (Culp 1997: 480), sometimes 
controversially so (Farber/Sherry 1993, 1995). The controversy 
largely occurred in the 1990s, as part of the resistance in some 
forms of legal scholarship to the “radical critique” of law, which 
argued that the very foundations of law – including legal schol-
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arship – were insufficiently inclusive of the experiences of “differ-
ent voices” (ibid.: 807). This dissension in the 1990s could trace 
its roots to the work of Cover in the 1980s, and, in particular, 
his famous proposition that “[n]o set of legal institutions or pre-
scriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give 
it meaning” (1983: 4). The essence of the legal narrative, or legal 
storytelling, movement inspired by Cover, however, was a broad 
church, extending to examinations of rhetoric (Sherwin 1988), 
as well as the consideration of issues of legitimacy and indeter-
minacy in law (Winter 1989: 2226), among other issues. Here, 
legal narrative is employed simply to provide social, political and 
economic accounts of one tax, in two different jurisdictions, at 
significant points in their historical “stories.”
 
Inheritance taxation in the United Kingdom
Estate duty
A significant proportion of the British history with which Piketty 
engages occurs within the (long-lasting) timeframe of the UK’s 
estate duty, and, thus, this tax serves as the starting point for this 
analysis. Inheritance taxation in the UK, however, far pre-dates 
the estate tax. Indeed it is perhaps an understatement to suggest 
that the United Kingdom has a long history with taxation of in-
herited wealth. Looking back from the present, its modern inher-
itance tax was introduced in 1984 as a successor to the Capital 
Transfer Tax, which itself had replaced a 100-year-old estate duty. 
Before the Estate Duty, there was something else (in particular, 
and amongst others, probate, legacy and succession duties) – 
and it appears that there has always been some form of taxation 
of inherited wealth in the UK (even before there was a United 
Kingdom) (Daunton 2007: 225). In a modern context, the Estate 
Duty had a particularly long and impactful reign.
The Estate Duty itself was introduced by the Finance Act 1894, 
the main innovation of which was to replace a number of other 
taxes. The taxes it replaced had come to exist within an overall 
structure that, by the time of their repeal, had become fairly com-
plex. The duty thus was a simplification initiative. The structure 
and foundations of the new Estate Duty prompted a vigorous, 
contemporaneous political discussion. Within this discussion, the 
idea of a tax on death was relatively uncontroversial. Churchill, 
for example, believed that the “psychological” impact of death 
duties was less “onerous” than that of income taxation. Indeed, 
Daunton reveals that Churchill supported, as a “political princi-
ple”, the idea of increasing death duties so as to fund reductions 
in income tax (ibid.: 132). 
Estate Duty aimed not only to pull the several existing duties under 
a singular tax, but also to introduce a tax which was “boldly and 
openly progressive”.8 The Economist described it as “[w]onderfully 
free from any electioneering taint”.9 This observation perhaps was 
offered in contrast to the period before the introduction of the 
Estate Duty, which had been marked by concerns both over the 
growing divide between wealthy property owners and the rest of the 
country, and uncertainty over whether a serious effort to redress this 
through taxation would interfere with law relating to property. In 
1796 Pitt, and others, worried that a tax on property might inter-
fere with the constitutionally guaranteed right to own land. Indeed, 
Jenkins explains that, in fact, there was “gross discrimination in fa-
vour of land” during this period (1998: 63). Thus it was against this 
background that Harcourt, who ultimately introduced the Estate 
Duty, wrote that he had “no doubt that we shall have a ‘formida-
ble enemy’ in those who find themselves deprived of monopolies 
they ought never to have possessed, and the privileges which enrich 
them at the expense of their poorer fellows” (ibid.). 
During this period, widows, in particular, were presented as hav-
ing a moral entitlement to inheritance (id.: 227). And yet, despite 
concern over their welfare, death duties, collectively, continued to 
increase in importance during this period as a source of revenue 
for the government (Lee 2007: 681).10 Lee explained that in fact 
it was the emerging clout of the “new money” class during the 
Victorian era that smoothed the way for the introduction of a tax 
which would ensure that “old money” classes bore a more equal 
share of the tax burden (ibid.). Thus, the Estate Duty was viewed 
as a tax which achieved “that elusive principle of taxing according 
to ‘ability to pay’”, given its foundation upon on a principle of 
proportionality (Sandford 1968: 11). 
How did it work? Probate, account and temporary estate duties 
were replaced with a single duty, which was then targeted at the 
aggregated value of all property left by the decedent (ibid.). De-
spite the apparent freedom from “electioneering taint”, this sim-
ple structure had been condemned by the political Opposition, 
which had preferred a rather more straightforward inheritance tax 
(id.: 13). They argued that it was unfair to assess a tax solely by 
reference to the estate of the deceased, with no consideration for 
the circumstances of the living persons who acquired the property 
(id.: 15). To support their case, the Opposition argued that ten 
children who, as a group, inherited £100,000 from their father, 
each would pay more in tax than an only child who inherited 
£10,000 (id., citing the speech of Mr Jeffreys, Hansard, Finance 
Bill in Committee, 29 May, 1894). Thus, although this tax may 
be based on a principle of ability to pay (the argument ran), in 
this example it is the ability of the dead father which is the focus, 
which they suggested was difficult to justify (ibid., citing Hansard, 
Parliamentary Debates, 10 May, 1894). 
Piketty, writing of this period in the UK, proposes that “[n]o other 
country devoted more thought to the taxation of inheritance in 
the twentieth century, especially between the two world wars” 
(2017: 674). The literature with which he engages largely criti-
cises the evolution of the Estate Duty, and its persistently limited 
reach. Piketty, in particular, approvingly cites the writings of 
 Josiah Wedgwood, who argued that wealthy, plutocratic classes 
had failed to prevent the rise of fascism in Europe; and, in fact, 
that lack of equality between the classes possibly had contributed 
to political instability (id., citing Josiah Wedgwood, The Econo­
mics of Inheritance (first edn, Pelican Books 1929)). Wedgwood, 
Piketty notes favourably, believed that a “progressive income tax” 
was the “main tool” for addressing this problem (id.). 
Capital Transfer Tax
Harcourt’s Estate Duty lasted until its repeal by the Finance Act 
1975, which introduced the somewhat ill-fated Capital Transfer 
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Tax (CTT). Capital Transfer Tax was a direct response to per-
ceived imbalances in wealth distribution that the Estate Duty had 
failed either to ameliorate or prevent.11 
In an oft cited statistic of the era, by the late 1970, approximately 
70% of the fortunes of the very wealthy in the UK were attributed 
to inherited wealth (White 2003). 
The government’s sense was that, by the early 1970s, the time had 
come for the 1894 Estate Duty to be the subject of a “thorough 
going review” (Davies 1972: 80). This was in spite of the fact 
that a period of heavy inflation was perceived as having increased 
the “burden” of Estate Duty (ibid.). This was because the tax was 
considered to be relatively easy to avoid, thus frustrating a fairer 
distribution of wealth (id.). The UK’s accession to the Europe-
an Economic Community in 1973 also increased the feeling that 
perhaps a review was necessary, as the Estate Duty felt a bit out 
of sync with other member states, many of which (then) had an 
inheritance tax (as opposed to an estate duty).12
A number of different options were considered. The innovation 
of the 1972 Green Paper, Taxation of Capital on Death: A possible 
Inheritance Tax in place of Estate Duty, which identified the oper-
ating principles of the Capital Transfer Tax, was to assess tax on 
the amounts received by beneficiaries, as opposed to the estate of 
a decedent (Cretney 1973: 285). The inheritance tax it proposed 
would have allowed consideration of the relationship between the 
decedent and family members, a line of thought which probably 
led to the 1975 Capital Transfer Tax’s unlimited exemption for 
spousal transfers. 
In the end, a capital transfer tax, and not an inheritance tax, was 
introduced. The CTT was “substantially different” from the Estate 
Duty it replaced (Wheatcroft 1974: 278). The rates differed, the 
unlimited spousal and charitable exemptions were comparatively 
innovative,13 and (previously) reduced rates for agricultural and 
business property were abolished (ibid.).14 The objective had been 
to introduce what could be described as a “unified transfer tax 
system”, taxing transfers both at death and inter vivos (Maudsley 
1975: 780). The taxation of inter vivos transfers was an important 
feature of the new CTT, as, previously, the UK had lacked any sig-
nificant form of gift taxation (ibid.: 783). The CTT was designed 
to change the focus of the previous system, which had been easy 
to avoid for most, and yet “severe” in consequence for those una-
ble to escape it (id.). The overall impression was that the process 
of dislodging the estate duty had been “fevered”, with a sense that 
“[a]t times [capital transfer tax] had seemed to be heading for the 
Guinness Book of Records rather than the Statute Book” (Wilson 
1975: 73). Yet with the Finance Act 1975 the CTT finally became 
law, almost a full year after its announcement in 1974.15
By 1980, however, worries that the CTT was no more effective 
in countering avoidance than estate duty were evident, along with 
suggestions that “exceptions, exemptions, and accepted avoidance 
devices” rendered the tax, on the whole, “ineffective” (Dobris 
1984: 363). It, like the Estate Duty before it, was a “voluntary 
tax” (ibid.). Fears grew that the CTT burdened small business-
es in particular; and, despite the introduction of (in some cases, 
quite generous) ameliorating measures meant to protect the in-
heritance of small family businesses, nostalgic and unfavourable 
comparisons with Estate Duty persisted.16 Most problematically, 
wealth remained concentrated (Dobris 1984: 364), and compli-
ance with the ever-elusive “ability to pay” principle remained just 
that (ibid.: 366). 
Inheritance Tax
In 1984 CTT was repealed, and an inheritance tax finally was 
introduced (per Inheritance Tax Act 1984 c.54). The Finance Act 
1986 introduced a tax which was assessed on “transfers of value” 
upon a person’s death (ibid.: s.2). Yet, as the Special Commis-
sioners involved in the case of Holland explained, the use of the 
phrase inheritance tax was a bit of a “misnomer”, especially given 
the structure of the tax, which focuses on the threshold value of 
the estate (Holland v CIR, [2003] STC (SCD) 43 (11 December 
2002) (Sp. Comm.)). The tax has had a somewhat contentious 
political history since; and, for now, perseveres.
Inheritance tax is intended to tax transfers of wealth at, or shortly 
before, death. The structure of the modern tax is outlined in the 
following box.
Inheritance tax is assessed as if, immediately before the decedent’s 
death, a transfer of value had been made to the heir (Inheritance 
Tax Act 1984, 24(1)). Then, all assets which exceed the threshold 
of £325,000 are taxed at a rate of 40% (ibid., s.1, para 1). Estates 
which do not exceed £325,000 are not taxed. Finally, transfers 
which fall below a minimum threshold are not taxed. 
A significant change introduced by the inheritance tax regime, 
effectively, was to end the taxation of lifetime gifts (Lee 2007). 
Thus, as a general rule, if transfers of wealth occur between three 
and seven years before death, they will be taxed at a reduced rate. 
If transfers are made more than seven years before death, they 
will not be taxed at all. Additionally, transfers between spouses 
and civil partners, and to political parties and charities, also are 
exempt from inheritance tax (Inheritance Tax Act 1984, s.18). 
Assets associated with small businesses and farms may receive re-
lief, which is achieved by reducing the value of the asset between 
50% to 100% (ibid., Part V). There have been a few changes in 
recent years, including the introduction of relief for residences 
and a promise of a simplification project from the Office of Tax 
Simplification,17 but this simple, basic structure endures. 
During the modern era, the Conservative Party long has cam-
paigned18 for the abolition, or significant curtailing, of the inher-
itance tax (Evans 2008), and in particular during the period in 
opposition when Tony Blair was prime minister. The Recession of 
2008 generally is presumed to have protected the inheritance tax 
from any serious attacks since. Nonetheless, and amongst other 
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criticisms, a general sense that it is a “double tax” continues to 
haunt (Lee 2007). Additionally, increasing house prices, and evi-
dence that wealth continues to concentrate, all contribute to the 
criticism that inheritance taxation fails to achieve its objectives 
(ibid.). Thus, although the tax remains, its future is by no means 
assured.
Inheritance taxation in Sweden
Whereas the previous section’s review of UK inheritance taxation 
occurred in the light of Piketty’s admiration for the quality of the 
political and philosophical discussion it has produced, this next 
section’s analysis of Sweden occurs against a different backdrop – 
one of fame.19 Sweden perhaps presents the model of the highly 
developed welfare state (Lindbom 2001). Taxation is crucial to 
that image; and thus the political discourse of tax reform in the 
United Kingdom often invokes the Swedish example.20 It is not 
too much of an exaggeration to suggest that Piketty’s proposal 
for a global tax on wealth feels like a Swedish idea. Certainly, the 
concept of deploying taxation as a tool either of redistribution 
or of economic rights appears to be an integral part of the social 
contract between voters and politicians in Sweden. In accordance 
with Dowding (2008) and Lindert (2004), it might be argued that 
the Swedish taxpayer in general has accepted high taxes on the 
basis that it provided those public and welfare goods that should 
benefit all citizens. Why, then, has the tax that might appear to 
be most justifiable on Piketty’s morality continuum been repealed 
in Sweden? What sort of socio-political discourse preceded this? 
Why, conversely, has the inheritance tax, consistently at the centre 
of controversy, continued to persevere in the UK? The histories 
which are detailed below reveal that, in many key respects, the 
histories – embedded in continuing criticism – are quite similar.
Inheritance and gift taxation
The first Swedish inheritance and gift tax legislation was intro-
duced in 1885. This was initially designed as an estate tax, where 
the size of the estate was used for determining the tax. However, 
from 1894 the inheritance tax was based on individual shares, 
rather than on the estate. Each beneficiary – heir or legatee – was 
taxed separately on the value of the property received from the 
deceased. In 1914 gift taxation was introduced with a primary 
objective of preventing avoidance through inter vivos transfers.21
In the early 20th century, tax rates were flat, and very low. At this 
point in time Swedish and British inheritance diverged substan-
tially due to the different positions between the countries dur-
ing the First World War. Whereas Sweden was a non-belligerent 
 nation, the United Kingdom engaged in mass mobilisation. As 
a result, the top rate of inheritance taxation in Sweden was only 
8% in 1920, while the corresponding figure for the United King-
dom was 40% (Scheve/Stasavage 2016: 82). In 1934, however, 
the Social Democratic government increased inheritance and gift 
tax rates, ultimately changing their role as a fiscal instrument. 
In the government bill introducing the rate change, Ernst Wig-
forss, the finance minister, argued that more revenue was needed 
to  mitigate the effects of the ongoing economic depression. As 
 revenue lagged behind economic growth, tax increases became 
necessary.  Wigforss noted that while part of that increased tax bur-
den  already had been met by increases in income taxes and con-
sumption taxes, a rise in inheritance and gift taxation  remained 
necessary. He also argued that wealthier citizens should share their 
part of the increased tax burden that was necessary to deal with 
the crisis. The Social Democrats contended that the inheritance 
and gift taxation should be based on a progressive scale, wherein 
the amount taxed for the heir increased progressively with the size 
of the wealth inherited.22 
The increased progressivity reflected a growing emphasis on 
 equity and redistribution within tax policy, generally, as revenue 
was needed to cover the increase in public spending that had 
been developing since the 1930s.23 This included not only the 
higher budget resources for active and interventionist macroe-
conomic policy, such as countercyclical and employment policy, 
It might be argued that the Swedish taxpayer in general 
has accepted high taxes on the basis that it provided 
those public and welfare goods that should benefit all 
citizens. Why, then, has the tax that might appear to be 
most justifiable on Piketty’s morality continuum been 
repealed in Sweden?
Box 1. The basic structure of inheritance taxation in the UK
Inheritance Tax is a tax on the estate (the property, money and possessions) of someone [who has] died.
There is normally no Inheritance Tax to pay if either:
• The value of [the] estate is below the £325,000 threshold
• you leave everything above the £325,000 threshold to your spouse, civil partner, a charity or a community
amateur sports club
If the estate’s value is below the threshold [one will] still need to report it to HMRC. 
If [one] give[s] away [one’s] home to [one’s] children (including adopted, foster or stepchildren) or 
grandchildren [one’s] threshold can increase to £500,000.
If [one is] married or in a civil partnership and [one’s] estate is worth less than [one’s] threshold, any unused
threshold can be added to [one’s] partner’s threshold when [one] dies. This means their threshold can be as 
much as £1 million. The standard Inheritance Tax rate is 40%. [It is] only charged on the part of [one’s] estate 





but,  increasingly, greater tax revenue for the continued expan-
sion of the welfare state, particularly universal social security and 
 enhanced public services.24
Because the Social Democrats would have such long periods in 
government, this interpretation of the inheritance tax continued 
to dominate tax policy during the 20th century.25 Box 2, which 
depicts the design of the Swedish inheritance and gift tax in 1991, 
is an illustration of the progressive structure of the inheritance tax 
and gift tax schedules within this Social Democratic tax policy. 
Both the tax bracket boundaries and the exemption rules reflect 
the original idea by Wigforss to transform the inheritance and 
gift taxes to a redistributive instrument in accordance with the 
ability-to-pay principle.
The Property Tax Commission
In January 2003 the Property Tax Commission published its first 
report on inheritance and gift tax, addressing inheritance between 
spouses specifically. As the government had waited until after the 
2002 general election to appoint the members of parliament who 
were included in the commission, the first report was prepared at 
a relatively rapid pace. As such, its recommendations were simple 
and straightforward. The commission proposed that the govern-
ment should entirely exempt inheritance tax for wealth inherited 
from a spouse. 
This was a radical proposal for the time. The public justification 
was that an increase in taxation would force spouses who inherited 
the family home to sell this property, if they lacked capital or other 
assets to pay the inheritance tax. During this period, rising prices 
in the real estate market had led to an increase in taxation that was 
not matched by any corresponding in-
crease in the home owners’ incomes.26 
In the period 1996–2001 the average 
value increase of a single family private 
home was 54%. The increase in city-re-
gions such as Gothenburg and Stock-
holm was even more considerable: 63% 
and 99%, respectively.27
In October 2003 the government in-
troduced a bill attempting to place the 
reforms suggested by the Property Tax 
Commission into law. It proposed that 
the inheritance tax on marital proper-
ty would be abolished from 1 January 
2004.28 The bill passed in December 
2003, with support from the Green 
Party and the Left Party. As part of 
the Parliamentary Tax Committee’s 
report, members from both parties is-
sued a statement of opinion (särskilt 
yttrande) in which they expressed their 
satisfaction with a repeal of inheritance 
tax between spouses, with the justifica-
tion that this would benefit surviving 
spouses with low incomes, and houses 
that were likely to increase in value. 
The committee also apologised that 
the reform had taken so long to pre-
pare. They suggested that it would have 
been preferable if the decision could 
have been implemented earlier in the year, but they had to accept 
the delay as part of their agreement with the Social Democrats 
(regarding the State budget and the related macroeconomic and 
fiscal policies).29
By 2003, debate about the future of the inheritance and gift tax 
evolved into one which focused wholly on tax competition, as a 
consequence of the government’s interpretation of Sweden’s po-
sition in relation to the policies of the European Union. In Sep-
tember of that year, the referendum on Swedish accession to the 
European Monetary Union (EMU), and the replacement of the 
Swedish Krona with the Euro, was held; and, the voters rejected 
Sweden’s accession to EMU. The Social Democratic Prime Min-
ister Göran Persson reacted to this outcome in his statement of 
government policy during the inauguration ceremony to the par-
liamentary session of 2003/2004. He declared that the fact that 
Sweden remained outside the Eurozone potentially could harm 
the Swedish economy and welfare state. As a consequence, com-
pensatory macroeconomic policy measures needed to be devised, 
including revision of corporate and capital taxes to ensure that 
these did not diverge considerably from the economies within the 
Eurozone with which Swedish firms competed.30 The prime min-
ister’s statement was a reflection of the close links the government 
had forged with the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise during 
the EMU campaign. Both the Social Democrats and the Con-
federation of Swedish Enterprise31 were in favour of a Swedish 
accession to the EMU, and thus campaigned on a joint platform 
in the months leading up to the referendum. 
Against this background, the government initiated “growth talks” 
(tillväxtsamtal) in the autumn of 2003. The Confederation of 
The Swedish inheritance and gift tax schedules, based on type of heir or beneficiary, in 1991. 
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0 - 
140,000 - 




      140,000 
     280,000 
     560,000 
  1,200,000 
11,200,000 
                                                  0 + 10 
                                        14,000 + 20 
                                        42,000 + 30 
                                      126,000 + 40 
                                      350,000 + 50 
                                   5,390,000 + 60 
Class II. Brothers, sisters, parents and other heirs 
Taxable lot in Swedish Kronor                                                                                                 Tax SEK    Percent 
0 - 





     35,000 
     70,000 
   140,000 
   280,000 
2,800,000 
                                                  0 + 15 
                                          5,250 + 25 
                                        14,000 + 35 
                                        38,500 + 45 
                                       101,500 + 55 
                                   1,487,500 + 65 
Class III. Non-profit organizations 






0 + 10 
4,200 + 20 
12,600 + 30 
Basic exemptions in SEK for heirs and beneficiaries 
Spouse:  280,000 
Children: 70,000 
Others:    21,000 
Gifts:       10,000  
 






Swedish Enterprise, the major labour unions and the associations 
representing the municipalities and county councils all were in-
cluded. During these talks, the Confederation of Swedish Enter-
prise proposed a radical tax policy reform: the government would 
abolish inheritance, gift and wealth taxation if the employers 
agreed that this loss of revenue would be replaced by abolition of 
a tax credit related to employee benefits for the first five employees 
in every firm. This proposal was rejected.32
Even as the “growth talks”, effectively, failed, several centrally 
placed stakeholders emerged in the aftermath. The Social Demo-
crats and the Left Party indicated that they could agree on some 
kind of settlement. Within the private sector, the Confederation 
of Swedish Enterprise was the most important actor for the gov-
ernment to consider. Yet by the spring of 2004, it seemed that 
all actors remained uncertain about how to proceed. Media re-
ports suggest that they adopted a “wait and see” strategy. The 
Confederation communicated that whilst they did not exclude 
any alternatives, they were not yet prepared to make any decisive 
commitments.33
In June 2004 the Property Tax Commission issued its second re-
port on inheritance and gift tax. This report recommended several 
changes in the legislation, and proposed that intergenerational 
transfer of closely-held (non-public) family businesses should be 
exempt from inheritance tax. The gift tax for owners who chose to 
transfer such firms inter vivos also would be lowered from 30% to 
15% of the net asset value (SOU 2004:66: 89-91). Additionally, 
gifts between spouses would be exempt from gift tax (ibid.: 18).
The Property Tax Commission worked towards achieving great-
er neutrality within the tax system, and towards correcting those 
distortions emanating from the many special incentives and ex-
ceptions that had been introduced over time. Two specific reforms 
were proposed (id.). First, the existing progressive inheritance 
and gift tax would be transformed to a proportional tax, where 
all subjects paid a 30% tax on inheritances or gifts. Second, it 
was proposed that the valuation rules, which varied according to 
the asset type under the current system, would be simplified. As 
a general rule, all assets and debts included in a bequest or gift 
would be valued at 50% of the market value. This would prevent 
strategies which focused on lowering the inheritance or gift tax by 
acquiring assets that had the lowest tax value. One example of this 
were shares quoted and valued on the different investment lists 
linked to the Stockholm stock exchange. According to the existing 
rules, such shares were subject to different inheritance and gift 
tax rates, depending on whether they were quoted on the “A” or 
“O” list. In turn, this meant that the owners of firms with shares 
quoted on the A list could move them to the O list in order to 
lower their tax. According to the Property Tax Commission, such 
strategies were considered to be unfair since they only benefited 
those groups who had access to tax planning (id.: 266-267; Swed-
ish Parliament, Recording of Proceedings 2004/05:52 Thursday 
16 December: 29).
Abolition and repeal
The publication of this report was the last major event that preced-
ed the budget negotiations ahead of the State budget that would 
be introduced in the autumn of 2004. During these negotiations 
the Social Democrats, the Left Party and the Green Party agreed 
to abolish the inheritance and gift tax altogether. In the govern-
ment bill, it was initially noted that the decision to repeal the 
inheritance and gift tax was a response to the criticism against it 
that had been voiced over the previous years. The arguments pre-
sented thus may be considered as a combination of those brought 
forward by the different actors dealing with inheritance and gift 
tax since the appointment of the Commission on Tax Mobility in 
2000 (ibid.). The government noted that the inheritance and gift 
tax was considered to be unfair due to the extensive possibilities 
for avoiding taxation that existed for wealthy groups. In addition, 
the inheritance and gift tax gradually had targeted new groups 
of property owners and stock owners, which was perceived as an 
unwanted and negative effect. 
In practice, several of the arguments previously raised by the Left 
Party were used as a motivation for the repeal. These included 
the problems for surviving spouses in coping with increased in-
heritance tax due to the rising value of their real estate (which in 
fact had been addressed in 2003; id.). Additionally, however, and 
with an indirect reference to the private members’ motion from 
the Left Party in 2001, the government emphasised the situation 
wherein increasing numbers of people had become active on the 
stock market, and the valuation issues that arose in connection 
with sudden shifts in the value of stocks after death (Government 
Bill 2004/05:25: 5).
From this perspective, it might be argued that a contributing 
factor behind the repeal of the inheritance tax was that it was 
becoming increasingly unpopular among taxpayers. A population 
survey of attitudes towards taxes in Sweden conducted in 2004 
showed that close to two-thirds of the respondents wanted inher-
itance and gift taxes to be either reduced or removed altogether 
(Hammar et al. 2008). Contributing to this view was the fact that 
a growing percentage of middle-class heirs had to pay inheritance 
tax while legislative changes in the late 1990s combined with in-
creasingly innovative strategies further enabled wealthy heirs to 
avoid the inheritance tax. This combination meant that the inher-
itance tax had started to lose its legitimacy among people because 
it became regarded as a voluntary tax for the very wealthy, while 
simultaneously hitting a large share of middle-class heirs (Henrek-
son/Waldenström 2016).
However, it must also be noted that the repeal was motivated, par-
ticularly, by the problems caused by inheritance taxation for in-
tergenerational transfer of family businesses.34 The criticism from 
the Property Tax Commission concerning valuation of shares and 
the related tax planning issues also was highlighted in this con-
text. Surprisingly, a common understanding developed between 
the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, the government and the 
Left Party regarding the significance of this argument, which is a 
very rare event in Swedish economic and political history. The 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, in a report for the Proper-
ty Tax Commission, argued in support of a repeal of the inher-
During budget negotiations in the autumn of 2004, the 
Social Democrats, the Left Party and the Green Party 
agreed to abolish the inheritance and gift tax altogether. 
Around 140,000 firms faced the risk of a generational 
shift as many Swedish business owners were at least 
50 years old. It was likely that those businesses would 
dissolve, as they would not be able to pay the gift and 




itance tax exclusively because of its impact upon family businesses 
( Government Bill 2004/05:25: 5).35 
They urged that a repeal of the tax was becoming increasingly ur-
gent, as many Swedish business owners were at least 50 years old. 
This meant that around 140,000 firms faced the risk of a genera-
tional shift. For a large majority of those firms, the existing inher-
itance and tax rules rendered intergenerational transfers uncertain. 
It was likely that those businesses would dissolve, as they would not 
be able to pay the gift and inheritance taxes as well as other, related 
taxes. The heirs who took over a family business would not only 
have to pay the inheritance tax, but also pay off the heirs who chose 
not to become partners in the business. Frequently, this forced heirs 
to sell part of the business in order to free up the necessary capital 
gains and dividends to fund such payments. This led to a further 
depletion of the business  capital which ultimately threatened the 
existence of the firm. The  Confederation also warned that an in-
troduction of uniform and neutral rules for the valuation of shares 
proposed by the Pro perty Tax Commission would increase the in-
heritance tax for those small businesses with a large degree of family 
ownership that were quoted outside the A list. This decision would 
affect the potential of many family businesses negatively as their 
future possibilities to attract capital would be constrained. This, in 
turn, threatened the overall prospects for growth and employment 
in the welfare state (Näringslivets Skattedelegation, Yttrande över 
betänkandet; SOU 2004:66, Egendomsskatter – Reform av arvs- 
och gåvoskatter: 2-3).
In the crucial parliamentary debate, Per Rosengren of the Left Party 
paid tribute to the role of small businesses in a growing economy. 
According to Rosengren, the repeal would not target traditional 
small businesses such as grocery stores or petrol stations which were 
protected by the exemption rules in the existing legislation. The 
general retail, wholesale and service level in the Swedish towns and 
cities would not have been threatened by a continued inheritance 
and gift tax. What Rosengren instead focused upon was compara-
tively larger, or growing, family businesses in the major cities, such 
as Stockholm, whose potential could be limited when owners used 
assets to pay inheritance tax, rather than invest them in order to 
expand. One case that was especially mentioned in this regard was a 
real estate developer in Stockholm who could have used the amount 
paid in inheritance tax to build 800–900 new apartments. Rosen-
gren also noted that, since Stockholm was a substantial contribu-
tor to aggregate growth, it was in the national interest to support 
emerging actors in the advanced service sector such as consultancy 
firms (Swedish Parliament, Recording of Proceedings 2004/05:52 
Thursday 16 December: 41).
It is obvious that changing attitudes towards the family business 
contributed to the repeal of the tax. The crucial issue became the 
intergenerational transfer, which was framed as a problem that 
threatened the potential contribution of family businesses to eco-
nomic growth and the welfare state. During the years after 2000, 
the general tax situation of closely-held (non-public) firms was 
subject to several inquiries. These focused on the problem that 
such businesses may be regarded as a unit created to support a 
family, or an individual; and to accumulate individual or fami-
ly wealth. Yet, as individual and business incomes are subject to 
different tax schedules, firm owners may be inclined to convert 
highly-taxed to low-taxed incomes/profits. It has therefore been 
necessary to control such tax planning through income-splitting 
within firms through legislation (Alstadsæter/Jacob 2012). 
In 2006 the Social Democratic government introduced quite gen-
erous income-splitting rules for closed (non-public) corporations 
through a reform of the so called “3:12 rules”. Through the in-
troduction of a standard rule, a significant portion of the wage 
income became subject to a reduced capital tax – 20% instead 
of 30% (which is the standard capital income tax) (Lodin 2011; 
Government Bill 2005/06:40). From this perspective it appears 
that, as the family business became increasingly recognised with-
in economic policy and tax policy, the perceived legitimacy of 
inheritance and gift taxation decreased even further. The inter-
pretation of the family firm as a tax subject shifted drastically as 
efficiency arguments replaced equity arguments. The repeal of the 
inheritance and gift tax thus evolved into a crucial measure in 
the ongoing policy shift towards small businesses. The tax thus 
was repealed, and no serious discussion relating to its resurrection 
exists in Sweden today.
Inherited wealth on a (comparative) moral continuum
One commonality of the histories of inheritance taxation in the 
United Kingdom and Sweden is concern over a tax which is per-
ceived as easily avoided. In the UK, anti-avoidance was a primary 
motivation behind the introduction of the Capital Transfer Tax.36 
In Sweden, the 2000 Commission on Tax Mobility noted a simi-
lar concern; and, in particular, identified the impact of inheritance 
taxation on small family businesses. This development largely has 
not captured the modern, public discourse surrounding inher-
itance taxation in the UK,37 which until recently has been focused 
on geographic inequity, and the value (monetary, and otherwise) 
of the family home (Rowlingson 2012). 
In the UK, by far the most valuable asset that many people will 
own is their family home, which also is the case in Sweden. The 
likelihood that the value of the home will meet the UK’s £325,000 
pound threshold for inheritance taxation depends very much on 
where one lives. Persons living in the South East of England (and, 
in particular, anywhere near London) are far more likely to own a 
home which exceeds the value of the threshold (Seely 2018). The 
sense of inequity thus may be felt by persons in the South East 
of England who must pay the tax, compared to persons who live 
in other parts of the country. A reason behind this may be class 
identification. Simply because one lives in a home in South East 
England, it does not follow that one will not consider oneself to 
be “working class” (ibid.: 18). Inheritance taxation is perceived 
in the UK to be a tax for persons who have grand “estates” – not 
for a grandmother whose terraced house exists in an area that was 
working-class during her youth, but now has been gentrified due 
to its proximity to London.38
The Swedish focus on family businesses is an interesting point 
of cultural comparison, and is also a focus which may well travel 
to find a home in UK discourse. The question will be whether 
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small businesses manage to capture the focus of the discussion. By 
way of comparison, Freedman has argued convincingly that small 
businesses generally are neglected by tax and other legal frame-
works in the UK (1994).
How a tax is perceived matters, in any country. It was Adam 
Smith who perhaps first argued that the tax system must be per-
ceived to be fair, otherwise, the temptation to resist compliance 
would grow (Smith/McCulloch 1838)39 And, indeed, it was the 
pursuit of fairness that influenced Sweden’s decision to repeal a tax 
with high levels of avoidance. Similarly, in the UK, this pursuit 
influenced the shift to the Capital Transfer Tax in the mid-1980s. 
The principle of ability to pay also is significant, as it drove the 
expansion of the UK’s Estate Duty for almost a century, even as it 
(generations later) fired concerns about the impact of inheritance 
taxation on small family businesses in Sweden.
What is the significance of these commonalities of experience in 
the modern, post-Piketty era? The foundation of Piketty’s thesis 
is that capital should not increase at a rate that is greater than 
economic output within the context of a system of legal rules (but 
cf. Murphy 2015: 613). He urges us to remember that “with-
out taxes, society has no common destiny,” and his proposal of a 
global tax on capital is a facet of this (2017: 493). He is arguing 
against the unfettered growth of the accumulation of capital, and 
in favour of the deployment of taxation as a tool to achieve this. 
And yet the comparative consideration of aspects of the taxation 
of inherited wealth in the UK and Sweden has demonstrated that 
perhaps the most significant commonality is that inheritance tax-
ation laws can have fraught existences. 
The coalition agreement by the Social Democrats, the Left Party 
and the Green Party in Sweden in 2004, supporting the abolition 
of inheritance taxation, is very evocative of the Conservative Party/
Liberal Democrat coalition formed six years later in the UK – with a 
key distinction: in order to form the coalition, and thus enter pow-
er, the leader of the Conservatives, David Cameron, was forced to 
abandon his promise to raise the inheritance taxation threshold to 1 
million pounds.40 The post-Recession economy of 2010, of course, 
was very different to the conditions which supported the Swedish 
coalition agreement of 2004, so it may have been that such an agree-
ment would have been impossible, at that point, in many countries. 
The price of the UK Liberal Democrats’ agreement was the intro-
duction of policies of “workfare” and austerity (MacLeavy 2011). 
From different narratives, however, one can discern a common 
tax principle. The consideration of the “ability to pay” principle, 
in both countries, wavered in a confrontation with a new taxpay-
er: in Sweden, the “family business” emerged, in some ways, as a 
singular taxpayer with ambitions unto itself; and, in the UK, the 
recession-hit middle-income taxpayer prompted a complicated 
set of discussions. 
Given that in Sweden, of course, taxation of inherited wealth was 
abolished – what, then, of these oddly parallel histories, with dis-
parate outcomes, can be preserved for a discussion of principles, 
and Piketty? In both countries, the volatility of income (com-
pared with capital) has produced volatile political responses, with 
more attention perhaps paid to the political power of tax than its 
capacity to effect social and economic change. Given the global 
reputation of Swedish taxation, the answer to the question “inher-
ited taxation has been abolished in either the United Kingdom, or 
Sweden: guess which?”, would, perhaps instinctively for the unin-
formed, be: Sweden. An argument for an opponent of inheritance 
taxation in the United Kingdom thus might run: taxing inherited 
wealth is such a bad idea, even Sweden has abandoned it.41
The retort to this argument is that consideration of the fragile 
histories of this tax in these two countries in some ways  reduces 
the importance of repeal/persistence within these histories. 
 Inheritance taxation appears quite fragile. Indeed, if the recession 
of 2008 had not occurred, perhaps inheritance taxation would 
have been repealed in the UK as well. If voting demographics had 
tended towards younger persons, as opposed to fifty-somethings, 
at pivotal moments in the Swedish history, perhaps the tax would 
have survived. Indeed, if, as in the UK, there had been a long 
existing exemption for spousal transfers in Sweden in 2003, then 
the domino effect of its repeal in the following year would never 
have occurred. With a fragile tax, any change can be  important. 
It is the points of convergence in these histories that are remark-
able. Both countries have found that reform has been driven by 
taxation of specific classes of taxpayers – those with small family 
businesses, farmers, families inheriting a family home, etc. – who 
are perceived as uniquely disadvantaged by a tax on capital. 
In Piketty’s Capital, the classes are drawn along much broader 
lines: those with income from capital, and those without. Yet 
this article has demonstrated that, in the United Kingdom and 
in Sweden, lines such as these are drawn, in the sphere of pub-
lic discourse, at levels of detail with much finer granularity. The 
question is not, thus: how are citizens with income from earnings 
treated as compared to those with income from capital? Rather, 
the question is: what about the small business person, the person 
who inherits grandmother’s house, farmers, and more?
Conclusion
With inheritance taxation, benchmarks for social justice are pur-
sued in concrete, quantifiable ways (Light 2005: 1647). Simply 
because the tax is abandoned, however, it does not follow that 
social justice has been abandoned – rather, different benchmarks 
come to the fore. The comparison in this article revealed similar-
ities between the United Kingdom and Sweden, in the context of 
the challenges posed by persistent avoidance of inheritance taxa-
tion, and, yet, severe consequences for those unable to avoid the 
tax. It also revealed differences, perhaps most notably the point 
that the UK’s focus on the language (estate/heir/capital transfer/
inheritance) of the tax appears not to be matched significant-
ly within the modern Swedish history. Ultimately, this article 
sought to investigate: what is it about inheritance tax that makes 
the question of economic rights and distributive justice one on 
Piketty urges us to remember that “without taxes, 
 society has no common destiny.”
Inheritance taxation appears quite fragile. Indeed, if the 
recession of 2008 had not occurred, perhaps inheritance 
taxation would have been repealed in the UK as well. 
If voting demographics had tended towards younger 
persons, as opposed to fifty­somethings, at pivotal 
moments in the Swedish history, perhaps the tax would 
have survived. If there had been a existing exemption 
for spousal transfers in Sweden, then its repeal in 2004 
would never have occurred. With a fragile tax, any 




which it remains difficult to reach and then to maintain social 
consensus? Comparison of two, different jurisdictions reveals an 
answer to this. The analysis here has revealed that the manner 
in which countries may organise taxes to respond to persistent 
inequalities in wealth may be more likely to represent collective 
responses to the challenges of individual taxpayers, and less likely 
to focus upon systematic responses to inequities in distribution of 
wealth.42 Given this, perhaps it is not surprising that the response 
to Piketty’s “call to tax” has been diverse: perhaps each reaction 
considers a different type of taxpayer who may be impacted by it. 
Indeed, the failure to realise which taxpayer a critic of the tax has 
in mind, as the histories of the UK and Sweden attest, may have 
significant consequences for the tax itself.
Notes
1 Thomas Piketty (1971–), professor of economics at the School 
for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS), whose book 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2013; 2014 (Engl. Transl.), 
Harvard) is the best-selling academic book ever published by 
 Harvard University Press. 
2 Jens Beckert (1967–), Professor of Sociology at the Max Planck 
Institute for the Study of Social Sciences in Cologne, and author 
of the highly influential Inherited Wealth (2004; 2008 (Engl. 
Transl.), Princeton).
3 Notably, the OECD have recommended inheritance taxation 
as a possible way forward in the effort to redress global wealth 
inequality. The Guardian 12 April 2018; OECD 2018. In the 
United Kingdom, in particular, the IFS has emphasised the grow-
ing inequality in parental wealth, suggesting that inequality of 
inheritance is a challenge for intergenerational equity (Bourquin 
et al 2020).
4 Beckert famously explained that “inheritance as a social problem 
emerges only when property rights are individualized and a purely 
family-based understanding of private property is transcended” 
(2008: 2-3). He was speaking of the transformation of the family 
unit, such that a member’s death meant only that one no longer 
“shared” in the property, but no property was transferred outside 
of the unit, to individualised processes of “acquisition” (ibid.: 3).
5 This review primarily focuses on the individual taxpayer and 
does not consider the impact of inheritance taxation on choices 
made within the corporate structure. For a thorough analysis of 
this, see Cheffins 2007.
6 For further readings on the normative underpinnings of inher-
ited wealth, see, inter alia, Halliday 2018: 74-95, exploring the 
connections between inheritance and understandings of luck; 
Halliday 2013, exploring whether inheritance taxation may be 
one of the least restrictive controls on inherited wealth, and thus 
may have much to recommend it; Pedersen 2018, providing a 
useful survey of common normative claims in inherited wealth; 
and White 2008, for an exploration of the common arguments 
against inheritance taxation.
7 Note 3, supra.
8 Sandford, describing the ambitions of Harcourt (1968: 11). 
9 Ibid.: 10, citing The Economist, 21 April 1894, 476. Pitt's pro-
posal during this period to introduce an additional tax on capital 
was attacked on the basis that taxes on property would threaten 
the freedom to own land (Daunton 2007: 226).
10 For criticism of the equality of opportunity argument, see, 
generally, Duff 1993: 49.
11 The promise to “tax the rich until the pips squeak” is often 
associated with the introduction of CTT (N.A., “Making the 
Pips Squeak: And a Lot Else Besides” 1975: 5). The Diamond 
Commission on the Redistribution of Wealth was established by 
the Labour Party in 1974, although, as Sandford emphasised, the 
government’s commitment to CTT preceded the establishment 
of the Commission (1980: 292). He speculated: “However, if the 
Diamond Commission had no influence on the legislation intro-
ducing Capital Transfer Tax… perhaps they affected the modifi-
cations…?” (ibid.). 
12 “There is no present requirement under the Treaties of the 
Community to harmonise death duties, but it is recognised that 
as the years go by, it will be increasingly difficult to subject a man 
who dies in the UK to a significantly different death duty regime 
from a man who dies in another EEC country. The basis of death 
duties in the EEC is the inheritance tax; the general principle is 
that tax on the transfer of estate to close relatives is relatively light” 
(ibid.; emphasis added). 
13 The treatment of lifetime transfers, however, was significantly 
less generous under the Capital Transfer Tax than that under Es-
tate Duty. (Wilson 1975: 77-78) 
14 Reliefs for agriculture gradually were introduced, however, 
particularly in 1976 (N.A. 1976: 146-148). Wilson wrote that 
“[t]here are important reliefs for agricultural property and wood-
lands…but they are hedged round with conditions to prevent 
them enuring for the benefit of ‘deathbed purchasers’” (Wilson 
1975: 78). The Finance Act 1976 tried to redress this, and aimed 
to simplify and enhance reliefs for agricultural land (Peters and 
Eckford 1977: 218). Nonetheless, dissatisfaction with the tax 
 remained, perhaps because of the sentiment that “[t]o claim, 
 however, that a tax burden is lower than it might have been can 
hardly be said to advance the argument very far, particularly when 
the comparative ease of completely avoiding estate duty is remem-
bered” (ibid.: 224). There is a case for suggesting that the long 
shadow cast by the (almost) century-long endurance of Estate 
Duty rendered any tax which followed it at risk.
15“…the Finance Bill had been preceded by a White paper on 
the tax published in August 1974; and the tax had to some extent 
been in force since March 26, 1974” (Wilson 1975: 73). This is 
because CTT had been “[e]ffective March 26, 1974, for lifetime 
gifts, and March 12, 1975, for transfers at death…” (Meyer 1978: 
8). The transition to this new regime was not without difficulty 
and anomalous results, as a satirical account of a (fictional) case 
involving “Lucky” and his “reviving” domicile of choice attested. 
See Flesch 1980: 366. Finally, a proposal to introduce a wealth 
tax was included in the 1974 proposals (see Verbit 1980: 27-28, 
citing “Wealth Tax”, Cmnd 5704 (1974)), which, in the end, was 
not enacted.
16 See discussion in Ashton 1978. 
17 www.gov.uk/government/consultations/inheritance-tax-review-
call-for-evidence-and-survey (last accessed 5 June 2019).
18 Consider, for example, David Cameron’s rhetoric in a tele-
vised debate prior to the 2010 UK general election, in which he 
characterised inheritance tax as anti-work and saving, quite the 
contrast with the earlier claims attributed to Churchill. http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_04_10_finaldebate.pdf 
(last accessed 22 October 2020).
19 “Everyone knows that Swedes pay a lot of tax; Sweden is as 




ABBA.” Why are Swedes OK with paying taxes? The Official 
Website of Sweden. https://sweden.se/society/why-swedes-are-
okay-with-paying-taxes (accessed 19 November 2018).
20 Author’s observation. In her experience of attending events in 
Parliament, the phrase “we cannot have a Swedish style welfare 
state with an American style tax system” is often repeated by (La-
bour) Members of Parliament. 
21 Asa Gunnarsson, Skatterättvisa (Iustus förlag 1995), 221-222; 
Gunnar Du Rietz, Magnus Henrekson and Daniel Waldenström, 
Swedish Inheritance and Gift Taxation (1885–2004) (2015).
22 Government Bill 34/1933.
23 This approach could be described as “egalitarian liberalism” 
(Sampford 1991: 57).
24 Cf. Gunnarsson, Skatterättvisa, 190-191; Enrique Rodriguez 
and Den offentliga sektorns expansion, Offentlig inkomstexpan-
sion : en analys av drivkrafterna bakom de offentliga inkomsternas 
utveckling i Sverige under 1900-talet (The expansion of public in-
come: an analysis of the major forces underlying the development 
of public income in Sweden in the twentieth century), LiberLäro-
medel/Gleerup 1980, 201-204.
25 During the examined time period, the Social Democrats were 
in government office during the periods 1932-1976, 1982-1991, 
and 1994-2006
26 SOU 2003:3, 34-35.
27 SOU 2004:36, 26.
28 Government Bill 2003/04:15.
29 Swedish Parliament, Report from the Parliamentary Tax Com-
mittee 2003/04:SKU7, 9.
30 Swedish Government Offices, Statement of Government Pol-
icy 16/9 2003.
31 The Confederation of Swedish Enterprise is the Swedish busi-
ness peak association and, as such, it represented both the general 
interest group for Swedish businesses and the main employers’ 
organisation.
32 The concerns focused on the impact of the proposals on small 
businesses. Erik Fichtelius, Aldrig ensam alltid ensam. Samtalen 
med Göran Persson 1996-2006 (Norstedts 2007), 226-234.
33 See Mattias Håkansson, Egentligen borde förmögenhetsskat-
ten bort (Flamman. 26 March. 2004); Åsa Brevinge, De skarpa 
förslagen dröjer. (Göteborgs-Posten. 27 March. 2004); Tidningar-
nas Telegrambyrå, Förmögenhetsskatten kommer att reformeras 
(2004); and, Nyhetsbyrån Direkt Nyhetsbyrån Direkt, Experter 
tror inte på sänkt skatt (2004).
34 The experience of Sweden in 2004 is evocative of Piketty’s de-
scription of the evolution of inheritance taxation in France during 
the Third Republic, when “[m]any felt that it was a ‘sacred duty’ 
to ensure that ‘a son would succeed his father,’ thereby perpetu-
ating the family property, and that such straightforward perpet-
uation should not incur a tax of any kind” (Piketty 2017: 664).
35 The concern reflected classic debates over taxation and equality 
of impact, on which see O’Kelley 1981: 13.
36 “[CTT]… is designed explicitly to tax the rich in a way they 
cannot avoid…” (N.A. 1975: Making the Pips Squeak: And a Lot 
Else Besides, Fortnight (101): 5-6). 
37 The Business Property Relief has been designed to protect fam-
ilies from being forced to sell inherited businesses to pay tax. See 
Inheritance Tax Act 1984, Part V, Ch.1. This recently has come 
under attack as a too-generous form of relief, particularly given 
their interaction with Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in-
vestment funds (BPR extends to certain shares of companies listed 
on the AIM, where the shares have been held for more than two 
years). Lucy Warwick-Ching, “Is it time to reform inheritance 
tax?” (27 April 2018), Financial Times, www.ft.com/content/
d38fb112-46df-11e8-8ee8-cae73aab7ccb (accessed 15 November 
2018). 
38 See also Asa Bennett, “Why everyone hates inheritance tax, 
even if they’ll never pay it” (11 April 2016), The Telegraph, 
Opinion, www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2016/04/11/why-every-
one-hates-inheritance-tax-even-if-theyll-never-pay-it (accessed 
15 November 2018), arguing that “New Labour strategist Philip 
Gould…said the policy [in 1992, of introducing a new top rate 
of income tax] proved the party had ‘failed to understand that 
the old working class was becoming a new middle class: aspiring, 
consuming, choosing what’s best for their families.’” 
39 “The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be 
certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of pay-
ment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the 
contributor, and to every other person.” (Book V, ch.2, 1838).
40 “David Cameron sacrifices inheritance tax policy to win Liber-
al Democrat Deal,” The Guardian (11 May 2010) www.theguard-
ian.com/politics/2010/may/11/coalition-government-conserva-
tives-lib-dem (accessed 24 May 2018).
41 Or, perhaps, that equality of income and wealth is desirable, 
but not necessary – in a repudiation of the Rawlsian position 
(1968: 53-54).
42 The conventional, normative tax discourse thus may be out-
dated, as Halliday argues (ch.8, 2018). Ultimately, we submit, 
the inheritance tax base is diverse. Piketty’s call for a global tax, 
by contrast, may be grounded in an idea of capital as monolithic, 
and unconnected from the possibility of subsets of taxpayers, and 
subsets of taxpayer cultures.
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